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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal arising out a lender's untimely attempt to obtain a deficiency judgment 
on a promissory note after sale of the real property collateral. The debtors obtained a 2006 loan 
to build a cottage1 on state-lease land near Payette Lake. The loan went into default and the 
lender sold the real property collateral. The lender claimed it was still owed additional amounts 
on the underlying promissory note and filed a complaint seeking a deficiency judgment. The new 
complaint, however, was untimely, per the three month deadline in LC. § 45-1512, and the 
District Court granted summary judgment dismissing with prejudice the lender's deficiency 
action. The lender brings an appeal of that dismissal judgment, arguing that its untimely lawsuit 
seeking a deficiency judgment can be saved by the relation back doctrine found in IRCP 12. 
This cross-appeal arises out of the lender's subsequent attempt to foreclose a different 
deed of trust on a different property to try and recover the same alleged deficiency that had 
already been barred by§ 45-1512 and the District Court. The debtors had a second loan with the 
lender (from 2008) and that loan was secured by a deed of trust on the debtors' residence in 
Boise. That deed of trust on the Boise residence had a cross-collateralization provision stating 
that the Boise residence also secured any other amounts owed by the debtors to the lender. After 
losing (and appealing) its deficiency action for the 2006 loan, the lender commenced an 
arbitration proceeding to foreclose on the Boise residence in order to recover the same claimed 
deficiency on the 2006 loan that had already been barred. The debtors asked the District Court to 
1 The District Court referred to the Cottage as a "cottage," so the Bridges will use that terminology as well. 
1 
block this effort to recover a claimed deficiency that had already been barred by the District 
Court as untimely under § 45-1512. The district court declined, leaving the issue for resolution 
by the arbitrator. The arbitrator, in tum, deferred to this Court for resolving the issue before him. 
The debtors bring this cross-appeal asking this Court to find that the judgment dismissing a 
deficiency action under § 45-1512 bars any further attempts to recover the claimed deficiency 
through any other collateral. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. The Cottage Loan and Default on the Cottage Note. 
Harold and Maj-le Bridges (the "Bridges") obtained a $1.5 million construction loan in 
2006 ("Cottage Note") from Idaho First Bank ("IFB") to construct their cottage on Payette Lake 
on land owned by the State of Idaho and leased to the Bridges. (R, pp. 373-374, 382-83.) The 
cottage and state lease were collateral for the Cottage Note, pursuant to a Construction Deed of 
Trust ("Cottage Doff"): 
For valuable consideration, Grantor does hereby irrevocably grant, bargain, sell and 
convey in trust, with power of sale, to Trustee for the benefit of Lender as Beneficiary, all 
of Grantor's right, title, and interest in, to and under the Lease described below of the 
following described real property, together with all existing or subsequently erected or 
affixed buildings, improvements and fixtures .... 
(R, pp. 382-83, 386-95.) The Bridges built a cottage that was approximately 5,000 square feet 
and intended it to be a permanent structure, with a cement foundation and a design and features 
specifically chosen to match the lake-front Property. (R, pp. 544-51.) 
In 2015, the Bridges defaulted on the Cottage Note, no longer able to afford the loan 
payments. (Id) Under Idaho law, before it could "institute a judicial action" against the Bridges 
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on the Cottage Note, IFB was required to sell the cottage and lease collateral to pay down the 
Bridges' Cottage Note. See LC. § 45-1503. 
2. IFB's Improper Lawsuit Seeking a Money Judgment Without First Foreclosing 
the Real Property Collateral. 
Instead, on June 19, 2015, IFB sued the Bridges seeking a personal judgment for the 
entire amount outstanding on the Cottage Note without seeking to foreclose on the Cottage 
Doff. (R, pp. 362-65.) The Bridges tried to convince IFB to voluntarily withdraw the Complaint 
and comply with LC. § 45-1503, but IFB refused. (R, pp. 549-50, 770-71.) The Bridges filed a 
short motion to dismiss, pointing out that the lawsuit had been filed in violation of Idaho's 
security first/one-action rule in§ 45-1503. (R, pp. 377-380.) IFB opposed the motion to dismiss, 
arguing that its lawsuit seeking a personal judgment, prior to foreclosure sale of the real property 
collateral, was proper. (R, p. 478.) IFB surprisingly claimed that the cottage and lease was 
personal property and not real property and therefore not subject to§ 45-1503. (Id.) 
3. Sale of the Real Property Collateral and the Untimely Deficiency Action 
Precluded By Idaho Statute. 
Before the motion to dismiss was resolved, IFB sold the collateral for approximately $1.2 
million. (R, pp. 489.) Two bidders had offered $1.2 million for the cottage and lease. (Id.) The 
sale closed on September 15, 2015. (Id.) With the sale of the collateral, the Bridges were 
preparing for a dispute about whether a deficiency existed and, if so, in what amount. 
On December 18, 2015, IFB filed a pleading entitled "Second Amended Complaint" (the 
"Deficiency Complaint"). (R, pp. 485-92.) This Deficiency Complaint admitted that the 
underlying cottage and lease were sold on September 15, 2015. (R, p. 489.) The Deficiency 
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Complaint alleged a deficiency owed of $344,377.24 after the sale of the collateral. (R, pp. 490-
91.) The Deficiency Complaint alleged two causes of action: (1) a "Claim For Deficiency Under 
Idaho Code § 28-9-615," which continued IFB's unusual argument that a cottage and lease are 
personal property rather than real property, and (2) a "Claim For Deficiency Under Idaho Code § 
45-1512." (Id.) 
4. Memorandum Decision and Judgment Dismissing the Deficiency Action With 
Prejudice. 
On January 21, 2016, the Bridges filed a motion for summary judgment because the 
Deficiency Complaint was untimely by three days (three months from sale of the collateral was 
December 15, 2015, but the Deficiency Complaint was not filed until December 18, 2015). (R, 
pp. 519-33.) The Bridges argued that IFB was now statutorily barred from claiming any 
deficiency was owed: "The Bridges ask the Court to find, as a matter of law, that IFB' s 
deficiency action . . . was untimely filed and thus IFB is forever barred from seeking any 
deficiency on the Note, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 45-1512." (R, p. 530, emphasis added.) 
IFB opposed dismissal with prejudice by raising two arguments: (1) its untimely action 
was saved by the relation back doctrine under IRCP 15 and its initial Complaint and/or First 
Amended Complaint filed June 19 and July 10, 2015, respectively; and (2) the collateral was 
personal property so Section 45-1512's three month deadline was inapplicable. (R, pp. 775, 779.) 
Ultimately, the District Court agreed with the Bridges that the tardy Deficiency 
Complaint had to be dismissed with prejudice. The District Court gave three different reasons for 
rejecting the "relation back" argument: 
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A. Idaho First Bank's deficiency claim under LC.§ 45-1512 is time barred. 
First, Idaho First Bank's deficiency claim simply did not arise out of the 
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in its 
original and first amended complaints. To be sure, the original and first amended 
complaints involved attempts to collect on the same loan involved in the section 
45-1512 claim. But there ends the relationship between the second amended 
complaint and the prior complaints. The prior complaints did not mention the 
deed-of-trust collateral. They neither asserted nor attempted to assert a deficiency 
claim (under section 45-1512 or otherwise). Presumably that is because a 
prerequisite to asserting such a claim-the sale of the deed-of-trust collateral-
had not yet occurred. The deed-of-trust collateral was not sold until September 15, 
2015, which is long after the prior complaints were filed. The section 45-1512 
claim arose out of the sale of the deed-of-trust collateral for less than the loan's 
balance, not out of the Bridges' loan default. Indeed, had everything else been the 
same but the sale proceeds equaled or exceeded the loan balance, no deficiency 
claim would have ever arisen, despite the Bridges' loan default. As such, it is 
incorrect to view the deficiency claim as having arisen out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in Idaho First 
Bank's original and first amended complaints. 
Second, and relatedly, relation-back is inappropriate because the deficiency 
claim under section 45-1512 had not even accrued when the prior complaints 
were filed. Such a claim does not accrue until the deed-of-trust collateral is sold, 
as no deficiency either exists or is calculable before the sale. It seems 
counterintuitive to apply Rule 15(c)'s relation-back doctrine in a way that causes 
any claim, including a deficiency claim, to relate back to a date earlier than the 
date on which the claim accrued. Indeed, a claim does not truly exist before it 
accrues. Had Idaho First Bank asserted a deficiency claim when it filed the prior 
complaints that claim would have been subject to dismissal because it had not yet 
accrued and, depending on the sale price ultimately obtained for the collateral, 
might never accrue. 
A claim usually should not be related back to a pleading filed before the claim 
accrued. An exception to this general rule applies "if the original pleading gave 
notice that the conduct, transaction, or occurrence is of a continuing nature." But 
that is not the case here. Idaho First Bank's original claims were not continuing in 
nature. They alleged the existence of one outstanding loan debt. A portion of that 
same debt remained outstanding after the sale of the deed-of-trust collateral 
enabled Idaho First Bank to bring a deficiency claim, but, again, that was not 
inevitable. The collateral could, at least in theory, have sold for a price high 
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enough to leave no deficiency. Consequently, Idaho First Bank's second amended 
complaint asserts a section 45-1512 deficiency claim that is a new claim, not a 
continuation of the original claims. Relation-back therefore is not appropriate. 
Third, relation-back is inappropriate because the original and first amended 
complaints were filed in violation of LC. §45-1503(1). Under that statute, the 
grantor of deed-of-trust collateral is ordinarily not subject to suit before the deed-
of-trust collateral has been sold in accordance with Idaho's deeds-of-trust act, at 
which point a deficiency claim may be asserted under section 45-1512 if the sale 
proceeds do not exhaust the loan balance. Idaho First Bank filed its original and 
first amended complaints before selling the deed-of-trust collateral, in reliance on 
an unsound argument that doing so did not violate section 45-1503(1) because the 
deed-of-trust collateral supposedly was "substantially valueless" under LC. §45-
1503(2). As discussed in this decision's section III(B), the cottage was real 
property, not personal property. Idaho First Bank's "substantially valueless" 
argument wrongly presumed the opposite. Moreover, it wrongly presumed the 
leasehold interest had no value. That the deed-of-trust collateral was not 
"substantially valueless" is proved by the $1,200,088 sale price it fetched. 
In any event, because Idaho First Bank violated section 45-1503(1) by filing 
its prior complaints before selling the deed-of-trust collateral, it seems entirely 
inequitable for its belated claim under section 45-1512 to relate back to the prior 
complaints. Rule 15(c) "'has its roots in the former federal equity practice."' The 
Court sees no good reason to invoke a rule that is designed to do equity so as to 
allow Idaho First Bank's premature filing of suit in violation of one provision of 
Idaho's deeds-of-trust act to excuse its failure to satisfy the filing deadline set in 
another of the act's provisions. 
For these reasons, the Bridges are entitled to summary judgment against Idaho 
First Bank's section 45-1502 claim. 
(R, pp. 774-78 ( emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).) The District Court also 
addressed and rejected IFB's attempt to re-characterize a cottage as personal property: 
B. Idaho First Bank has no deficiency claim under I.C. § 28-9-615 because that 
statute is inapplicable when the collateral is real property. 
. . . The Bridges seek summary judgment against Idaho First Bank's section 
28-9-615 claim on the theory that its collateral was real property, which would 
mean that section 28-9-615, along with the rest of Article 9, is entirely 
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inapplicable. Idaho First Bank does not disagree that section 28-9-615 is 
inapplicable if the collateral was real property; in other words, it does not argue 
for applying of any of the exceptions to Article 9's inapplicability to interests in 
or liens on real property. Instead, it argues (rather meekly) that the cottage is 
personal property. 
Once again, Idaho First Bank's collateral was (i) the Bridges' leasehold 
interest in the cottage site, and (ii) the cottage ultimately constructed there. As the 
Court will proceed to explain, these items of collateral are both real property. 
Beginning with the leasehold interest, the Court notes that, under Idaho law, 
"real property" includes not only land itself but also "possessory rights to land." 
LC. § 55-101(1). The Bridges' leasehold interest in the cottage site is a possessory 
right to land. Thus, the leasehold interest is real property. Idaho First Bank wastes 
no effort arguing to the contrary. 
Turning to the cottage, the Court notes that, under Idaho law, "[t]hat which is 
affixed to land" also is real property. LC. § 55-101(2). An article is affixed to land 
if it is (i) actually and constructively annexed to the land, (ii) appropriated to the 
use of that part of the land to which it is annexed, and (iii) the party annexing it to 
the land intended to make the article a permanent accession to the land. Idaho 
First Bank suggests that whether the cottage is "affixed to land" under this three-
pronged test should not be determined before trial. But it offers no evidence to 
contest the Bridges' showing that the cottage is "affixed to land" under that test. 
The Bridges' evidence shows that the cottage cost well in excess of $1 million 
to build, is 5,000 square feet in size, is built on a cement foundation that is 
embedded in the ground, and was designed to match the slope, topography, size, 
and orientation of the leased property, as well as the surrounding environment and 
nearby Cottages. The Bridges' evidence also shows that they intended the cottage 
to be a permanent part of the leased property and that they constructed it without 
any contingency planning for its future removal from the leased property. This is 
exactly as one would expect of a home so costly and so large; structures of that 
nature are not generally built with an eye to relocating them to different real 
property in the future. The Bridges' evidence, considered by itself, satisfies the 
three-pronged test. 
Idaho First Bank offers nothing to counterbalance it. At most, it renews its 
argument, made in the context of the Bridges' motion to dismiss its first amended 
complaint, that the cottage is personal property because it is defined as "Personal 
Property" in the Bridges' most recent lease of the cottage site. The cottage's 
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characterization for purposes of the current lease is insignificant. There is no 
reason the cottage could not be characterized as "Personal Property" for purposes 
of the lease relationship between the Bridges and the Idaho Department of Lands 
yet constitute real property as a matter of Idaho law for purposes of the loan 
relationship between the Bridges and Idaho First Bank. 
Indeed, the Construction Deed of Trust includes "buildings" in its definitions 
of the terms "Real Property" and "Improvements" but does not include 
"buildings" in the definition of the term "Personal Property." The cottage surely is 
a "building" under that term's ordinary meaning, making it "Real Property" for 
purposes of the Construction Deed of Trust. Thus, the terms of the Construction 
Deed of Trust are powerful evidence that, at the time it contracted with the 
Bridges, Idaho First Bank regarded the to-be-constructed cottage as real property 
rather than personal property. 
The Bridges' years-later agreement with the Idaho Department of Lands to a 
renewed lease that characterizes the cottage as "Personal Property" does not give 
rise to a reasonable inference that the Bridges intended, at that point or any other, 
for the cottage to be removed from the cottage site, as might disqualify it from 
having "real property" status as an article "affixed to land." That is true even 
though both the Bridges' original lease and the one to which they last agreed 
identify circumstances in which the Idaho Department of Lands could cause the 
cottage's removal. The mere theoretical possibility of removal does not cause the 
cottage to fail the "affixed to land" test, particularly in the absence of any 
evidence the Bridges ever intended or expected removal to occur, as well as in the 
absence of any evidence that removal-and the obvious waste associated with it-
was anything more than a theoretical or remote possibility. 
(R, pp. 779-81 (internal citations omitted).) The District Court entered a short Judgment on April 
27, 2016: "Plaintiff Idaho First Bank's second amended complaint is dismissed with prejudice, 
with no award ofreliefto Idaho First Bank." (R, p. 766.) 
5. IFB's Motion to Reconsider Denied and Its Appeal. 
On May 11, 2016, IFB filed a motion for reconsideration, re-arguing that the relation 
back doctrine should save its untimely Deficiency Complaint. On August 1, 2016, the District 
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Court denied the motion to reconsider and gave further reasons why the relation back doctrine 
was inapplicable: 
First, after the Court granted summary judgment to the Bridges, the Nevada 
Supreme Court decided a similar case, Badger v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 
373 P.3d 89 (Nev. 2016). There, the borrower and the guarantor defaulted on a 
loan. Before foreclosing on its loan collateral, the creditor sued the guarantor for 
the loan balance. While that lawsuit was pending, the creditor foreclosed, 
generating proceeds less than the loan balance and leaving a deficiency. Nevada 
law gave the creditor six months after the foreclosure to sue for a deficiency 
judgment. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.455(1). Within the six-month period, the creditor 
filed a separate lawsuit [against] the borrower to seek a deficiency judgment. The 
creditor failed, however, to seek a deficiency judgment against the guarantor 
within the six-month period. After the six-month period ended, the creditor's 
separate lawsuits against the guarantor and the borrower were consolidated. The 
creditor amended its complaint against the borrower to also seek a deficiency 
judgment against the guarantor. The parties litigated whether the creditor's 
amended complaint related back to its initial complaint against the borrower, thus 
rendering timely the creditor's otherwise untimely claim for a deficiency 
judgment against the guarantor. The Nevada Supreme Court ruled against the 
creditor, holding that "a complaint filed prior to a foreclosure sale cannot 
sufficiently put an obligor on notice of a deficiency claim," id. at 94, and that 
allowing relation-back in this context would permit creditors to circumvent the 
statutory scheme by filing pre-foreclosure lawsuits with the intent to amend their 
complaints to seek deficiency judgments after foreclosure. Id. at 95. Badger thus 
furnishes additional support for the Court's summary-judgment decision that an 
amended complaint asserting an untimely claim for a deficiency judgment does 
not relate back to a collection complaint filed before foreclosure, in violation of 
Idaho's "one action" rule. 
Second, the Court will distinguish Security Insurance Co. v. United States ex 
rel. Haydis, 338 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1964), on which Idaho First Bank relies in its 
reply memorandum in support of its motion to reconsider. That was a Miller Act 
case. The Miller Act requires prime contractors on some federal construction 
projects to post bonds guaranteeing payment of their subcontractors and suppliers. 
It requires subcontractors and suppliers to wait at least ninety days after last 
furnishing labor or materials to sue on a bond. 40 U.S.C. § 270b(a). The plaintiff 
in Security Insurance was a supplier suing on the prime contractor's bond. The 
supplier's lawsuit was filed prematurely, however, before the ninety-day waiting 
period lapsed. At the time of trial more than a year later, the defendant sought 
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dismissal on grounds of prematurity. The supplier responded by filing a 
supplemental complaint containing an allegation that the waiting period had since 
lapsed. Not only had the waiting period lapsed by then, but so had the Miller 
Act's statute of limitations. On that alternative basis, the defendant sought 
dismissal. The supplier argued that the supplemental complaint related back to the 
original complaint, avoiding the statute-of-limitations problem. The Ninth Circuit 
accepted the supplier's relation-back argument. 338 F.2d at 449. 
The difference between that situation and this one, though, is that there was no 
unsatisfied condition precedent to the existence of the supplier's Miller Act claim 
when it filed suit, whereas there was an unsatisfied condition precedent to the 
existence of Idaho First Bank's claim for a deficiency judgment when it filed suit. 
In other words, the supplier had an accrued Miller Act claim when it filed suit but 
merely lacked the right to do so at that time because the waiting period had not 
yet lapsed. Idaho First Bank, by contrast, had no accrued claim for a deficiency 
judgment when it filed suit because it had not yet sold the loan collateral and 
doing so was a condition precedent to accrual. See I. C. § 45-1512. Security 
Insurance was distinguished in much the same way in United States ex rel. Wulff 
v. CMA, Inc., 890 F .3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1989), on which the Court relied in its 
summary-judgment decision. It does not support applying the relation-back 
doctrine here. 
(R, pp. 822-24.) 
On September 7, 2016, IFB filed a notice of appeal from the District Court's decision. (R, 
pp. 827-30.) The Bridges assumed they were close to the end: the Idaho Supreme Court would 
rule on this legal issue of the effect of a late filed deficiency action, hopefully affirming the 
District Court's (twice) well-reasoned decision, and the Bridges' litigation with IFB, on-going 
since June 19, 2015, would finally be over. 
6. New Arbitration Action Seeking to Use Other Collateral to Recover the Same 
Alleged Deficiency on the Cottage Note That Had Already Been Barred. 
Instead, on October 6, 2016, IFB sent the Bridges a document seeking to commence 
arbitration "for foreclosure and satisfaction of all amounts owing under 2 loan transactions." (R, 
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pp. 888, 894-96.) IFB was seeking to start a new foreclosure action against the Bridges based on 
the same claimed deficiency that Judge Scott had just dismissed with prejudice, while the appeal 
before this Court was pending. (Id.) 
IFB based its new foreclosure action on a second loan that it provided to the Bridges in 
2008. At the end of the construction of their cottage, the Bridges requested a second loan of 
$150,000. (R, pp. 867-69.) The Bridges signed a separate, second promissory note ("Residence 
Note") and second deed of trust (the "Residence Deed of Trust") for the second loan. (R, pp. 
871-86.) The Residence Deed of Trust secured the second loan through a lien on the Bridges' 
residence in Boise (not a lien on the cottage in McCall). (R, pp. 878-86.) The Residence Deed of 
Trust contained a cross-collateralization provision that purported to use this lien on the Bridges' 
residence in Boise to secure all other amounts that the Bridges owed to IFB, i.e. all amounts 
owed under the Cottage Note. (R, p. 878.) The cross-collateralization clause states: 
Cross-Collateralization. In addition to the Credit Agreement, this Deed of Trust 
secures all obligations, debts and liabilities, plus interest thereon, of [the Bridges] 
to [IFB], ... whether now existing or hereafter arising, whether related or unrelated 
to the purpose of the Credit Agreement, whether voluntary or otherwise, whether 
due or not due, direct or indirect, determined or undetermined, absolute or 
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, whether Grantor may be liable individually 
or jointly with others, whether obligated as guarantor, surety, accommodation 
party or otherwise and whether recovery upon such amounts may be or hereafter 
may become barred by any statute of limitations, and whether the obligation to 
repay such amounts may be or hereafter may become otherwise unenforceable .... 
(Id. ( emphasis added).) 
IFB asserted that the Residence Note was in default based on the Cottage Note default 
and that it could foreclose on the Residence Deed of Trust to recover its claimed deficiency on 
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the Cottage Note the District Court had just dismissed with prejudice. (R, pp. 887-96.) IFB 
pursued this new argument in arbitration and not to the District Court. (Id) Despite the District 
Court's ruling that there could be no deficiency judgment on the Cottage Note under LC. § 45-
1512, IFB was claiming in arbitration that it still had a right to recover the full amount of that 
claimed deficiency by enforcing a cross-collateralization provision in the separate 2008 Deed of 
Trust encumbering the Bridges' Boise home. 
7. Bridges' Motion to Stop IFB's Collateral Attack on Final Judgment in 
Arbitration and Have the District Court Resolve the Cross-Collateralization 
Argument. 
The Bridges the asked the District Court to stop this collateral attack on its final judgment 
pending on appeal before this Court. (R, pp. 853-866.) The Bridges asked the District Court to 
(1) preclude IFB from raising these same Cottage Note deficiency claims in a second, different 
forum after having litigated that deficiency claim for over a year to a final judgment; (2) rule that 
its final judgment had res judicata effect to preclude this new argument by IFB to recover its 
claimed Cottage Note deficiency, which should have been raised with the District Court and is 
now barred by claim preclusion; or (3) alternatively, if not barred by its prior final judgment, 
then substantively reject this cross-collateralization argument based on at least five separate 
reasons. (Id) 
8. District Court Orders that Final Judgment Does Not Bar Cross-Collateralization 
Argument and Arbitration Can Resolve Cross-Collateralization Argument. 
After oral arguments, the District Court rejected those arguments in a written opinion 
issued on December 15, 2016: 
During the course of the appeal, which is pending, Idaho First Bank initiated 
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an arbitration proceeding against the Bridges, through which it is attempting to 
establish, among other things, that it may collect the remaining balance of the 
2006 loan by foreclosing on the collateral the Bridges granted in connection with 
a separate loan it made to them in 2008. The collateral instrument for that loan 
contains what is commonly called a "cross-collateralization clause." The clause 
provides that the collateral-a home located in Boise-secures not only the 2008 
loan, but also any other debts the Bridges owe Idaho First Bank. Because of that 
provision, Idaho First Bank contends it may collect the remaining balance of the 
2006 loan out of the proceeds of a foreclosure sale of the collateral for the 2008 
loan. 
After Idaho First Bank initiated the arbitration proceeding, the Bridges filed a 
motion asking the Court to block it. The Bridges also asked the Court to rule that 
the remaining balance of the 2006 loan has been extinguished and is uncollectable 
by any means, including resort to the collateral for the 2008 loan. The Bridges' 
motion was argued on December 5, 2016. The Court denied the motion in an oral 
ruling. This order confirms that ruling in writing and supplements the Court's 
reasoning. 
Because Idaho First Bank's appeal is pending, the Court lacks unfettered 
jurisdiction over this action. The jurisdiction it has is prescribed by I.A.R. 13(b ). 
The Bridges contended their motion fits within the jurisdiction grants of I.A.R. 
13(b)(6) and I.A.R. 13(b)(13). 
The former of those rules, I.A.R. 13(b)(6), grants jurisdiction to decide 
motions made under I.R.C.P. 60(a) or 60(b) while an appeal is pending. The 
Bridges regarded their motion as one made under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l) and 60(b)(6). 
Thus, to the extent the Bridges sought relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l) or 60(b)(6), 
the Court had jurisdiction to decide their motion. The Court concluded, however, 
that no relief was appropriate under those rules. There is no "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" that justifies granting the Bridges 
relief from the judgment under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l), nor is there "any other reason 
that justifies relief' from that judgment under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). Indeed, the 
judgment awarded them complete relief: dismissal of Idaho First Bank's 
deficiency claims with prejudice. The Court sees no justification for reopening 
this action to litigate whether the Bridges are entitled to an additional measure of 
relief they didn't seek: a declaratory judgment that the remaining balance of the 
2006 loan is extinguished and not collectable by resort to collateral other than the 
McCall cottage. 
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The latter of those rules, I.AR. 13(b)(13), grants jurisdiction to "(t]ake any 
action or enter any order required for the enforcement of any judgment or order." 
The Court concluded that the Bridges' motion doesn't truly seek relief of that 
nature. The judgment the Court entered is self-enforcing--it's a judgment of 
dismissal, awarding Idaho First Bank no relief on its deficiency claims. The 
arbitration proceeding Idaho First Bank subsequently commenced isn't an attempt 
to relitigate its deficiency claims. Instead, it's an attempt to collect the remaining 
balance of the 2006 loan by resort to collateral other than that which was at issue 
in this action. 
Whether or not Idaho First Bank has the right to do so, Idaho First Bank's 
attempt to do so isn't a subversion of the judgment in this action. The relief the 
Bridges seek isn't merely enforcement of the judgment; it's an expansion of the 
judgment to resolve whether the remaining balance of the 2006 loan is 
extinguished (not just uncollectable by way of a deficiency claim) or instead may 
be collected by resort to other collateral. The Court lacks jurisdiction under I.AR. 
14(b)(13) to grant relief that amounts to expanding, rather than merely enforcing, 
the judgment. 
Finally, the Court expressed the view that Idaho First Bank didn't waive its 
right to arbitration under the 2008 loan documents, including the 2008 collateral 
instrument with the "cross-collateralization clause" at issue, by litigating this 
action. Thus, even if there were no jurisdictional impediment to granting the 
requested relief, the Court wouldn't grant it. The arbitrator can decide whether 
Idaho First Bank has the right to collect the remaining balance of the 2006 loan 
through resort to the collateral for the 2008 loan. 
(R, pp. 958-62.) The Bridges then filed their timely cross-appeal. (R, pp. 963-70.) 
9. Utah Arbitrator Stays Proceedings to Allow This Court to Rule on Idaho Law. 
The arbitration proceeding is now stayed by order of the arbitrator, James R. Holbrook 
(University of Utah law professor), who recognized the better position of this Court to apply 
Idaho law and address the same issues that he was being asked to address: 
9. The Arbitrator has determined one of the questions to the Supreme Court, 
which the Bridges have included in their Appeal, is whether the Bank has the 
right to collect the Cottage Deficiency under the Residence Loan Clause, or 
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whether the Cottage Deficiency was extinguished and is therefor uncollectable as 
Residence Loan Debt. This issue is the crux of the Arbitration. 
10. Because of the significance to the Parties of this issues -which is on appeal to 
the Supreme Court to be decided there under Idaho law - and because this issue 
will be decided within 18 months or less, the Arbitrator has determined to grant 
the Stay Motion pending the outcome on appeal. 
(See Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Request for Judicial Notice, filed contemporaneously, 
Ex. A, pp. 2-3.) The arbitrator's two orders granting the stay of arbitration pending resolution of 
this appeal are not in the Clerk's Record of this matter but the Bridges have requested that this 
Court take judicial notice of those orders. (See Request for Judicial Notice of Filings in Related 
Arbitration, filed contemporaneously.) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court's judgment dismissing, with prejudice, the deficiency 
action on the Cottage Note was properly entered because the relation back doctrine in IRCP 15 
has no applicability to save the untimely filing and the cottage and lease are properly 
characterized as real property for purposes of LC. § 45-1512. 
III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court erred in failing to rule that its judgment dismissing the 
deficiency action on the Cottage Note barred any subsequent attempt to foreclose on other 
collateral to recover the same alleged deficiency on the Cottage Note, based on principles of 
claim preclusion. 
2. Whether the cross-collateralization provision can be used to collect a deficiency 
that is otherwise barred by LC. § 45-1512, an issue raised but not reached by the District Court. 
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IV. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondents/Cross-Appellants Bridges are claiming attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
V. ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S APPEAL 
A. Standard of Review of District Court's Summary Judgment Ruling. 
The Bridges agree with the Standard of Review in Appellant's Brief regarding the issues 
that Appellant raised. 
B. The District Court Properly Applied I.C. § 45-1512 in Dismissing IFB's Claim for 
Any Deficiency Under the Cottage Note. 
IFB has admitted that it missed the three month deadline for a deficiency action found in 
I.C. § 45-1512. IFB has no one to blame but itself for that error. The statute is clear and is easily 
met. The Bridges certainly have no blame for IFB' s mistake. Thus, this litigation and appeal is 
solely IFB's attempt to ask the courts to bail it out and avoid the known and obvious 
consequences of its mistake. 
IFB has consistently raised only two arguments to try and save its Deficiency Complaint 
that it has always admitted was filed three days after the three month deadline in Idaho Code § 
45-1512. IFB claims that (1) Idaho Code§ 45-1512 is inapplicable because the cottage and lease 
are personal property, not real property; and (2) the Deficiency Complaint is not untimely 
because an earlier complaint was filed and that earlier filing date should be used to meet the 
requirements in Section 45-1512. Both arguments were properly rejected by the District Court 
and should be rejected by this Court, as discussed below. 
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1. The Cottage and Lease Are Real Property. 
IFB does not dispute that a leasehold interest in the cottage site is a real property interest. 
See LC. § 55-101 ("Real property or real estate consists of: 1. Lands, possessory rights to land 
... "); Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 272, 688 P.2d 1172, 1177 (1984) ("Under a lease of real 
property, the lessee has the possessory interest .... "). However, IFB argues that the lease alone is 
valueless and what it was actually selling was the cottage. IFB claims that the cottage was 
personal property, not real property, so the foreclosure statutes for real property (including the 
anti-deficiency statute Section 45-1512) are inapplicable. That argument defies all common 
sense and logic, long established real estate legal principles, Idaho case law, the Deed of Trust 
contract that the parties signed, and IFB' s own long-standing characterization of the collateral. 
a. Cottage is Affixed to Real Property Based Upon All Objective Evidence. 
Idaho statute defines real property to include not only the land itself but also "that which 
is affixed to land." LC. § 55-101(2). The test for "affixed to land," which was cited by the 
District Court and IFB, is found in Spencer v. Jameson, 147 Idaho 497, 501-02, 211 P.3d 106, 
110-11 (2009): 
When faced with the issue of fixture, we apply three general tests: "(1) 
Actual or constructive annexation to the realty; (2) Appropriation to the use of 
that part of the realty to which it is connected; [ and] (3) Intention of the party so 
annexing to make the article a permanent accession to the realty." 
(Id) In Spencer, this Court examined a "mobile" home and the affidavit of its owner that 
explained how it had been affixed to the land by use of a well, septic system, driveway, power 
lines, foundation, and decks. (Id) This Court found that the mobile home was affixed and, 
therefore, real estate for purposes of a non-judicial foreclosure. (Id) Since the mobile home in 
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Spencer was affixed, then certainly the cottage in this case is even more so affixed. 
This Court recently further elaborated on intent determined in the third prong of the test, 
and adopted nine factors for consideration: 
In Rayl [v. Shull Enterprises, Inc., 108 Idaho 524, 700 P.2d 567 (1984)], the Court 
explained the intent factor as follows: 
The intention sought is not the undisclosed purpose of the annexor, but 
rather the intention implied and manifested by his act. Thus, the intent 
should be determined from the surrounding circumstances at the time of 
installation, and not necessarily from testimony as to the subjective intent 
of the installer and his frame of mind at the time of installation. [T]he 
inquiry is not strictly as to the intention of the person himself who 
annexed the chattel to the freehold .... The inquiry is as to what intention 
must be imputed to him in the light of all the circumstances, when tested 
by the common understanding of those familiar with the subject. 
The Court of Appeals has listed nine factors useful in objectively determining 
intent: 
(1) the nature of the article; (2) the manner of annexation to the land; (3) 
the injury to the land, if any, by its removal; (4) the completeness with 
which the chattel is integrated with the use to which the land is being put; 
(5) the relation which the annexer has with the land such as licensee, 
tenant at will or for years or for life or fee owner [sic]; (6) the relation 
which the annexer has with the chattel such as owner, bailee or converter; 
(7) the local custom respecting treating such chattel as personal property 
or a fixture; (8) the time, place and degree of social, economic and cultural 
development, (e.g., a luxury in one generation is a necessity in another ... ); 
and (9) all other relevant facts surrounding the annexation. 
Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S., 159 Idaho 679, 
692, 365 P.3d 1033, 1046 (2016)(citations and internal quotations omitted). 
Of the Spencer three part test, IFB appears to concede the first two prongs but challenges 
the intent prong. Interestingly, IFB does not address the nine factors related to objective intent 
from the Liberty Bankers case, as the nine factors all weigh in favor of showing objective intent 
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to affix the Cottage. The undisputed facts are that the cottage is on a cement foundation that is 
embedded in the ground; the materials used to build it were specifically chosen to match with the 
environment as a cottage on the shores of Payette Lake; it was built into the slope of the property 
and shaped and designed to match the topography; it was used as a residence on the Property; it 
is over 5,000 square feet; it sold for $1.2 million; and, the construction of the cottage did not 
include any contingency planning for future removal or transport of the cottage to a site property. 
(R, pp. 421-444, 547-548.) 
In other words, each of these Liberty Bankers objective factors is addressed by the 
undisputed evidence: 
(1) "nature of the article" -
(2) "manner of annexation to the 
land" -
(3) "injury to the land ... by its 
removal" -
(4) "completeness with which 
the chattel is integrated with 
the use to which the land is 
being put" -
5) "relation which the annexer 
has with the land" -
(6) "relation which the annexer 
has with the chattel" -
(7) "local custom respecting 
a cottage residence; 
constructed on a foundation built into 
the land and built to match the 
topography; 
no contingency for removal and 
therefore likely significant damage, if 
not complete destruction; 
wholly integrated like any home; 
long-term lease with rights to recover all 
value from the cottage upon non-
renewal of the lease; 
owner of the cottage with rights to 
recover value; 
local custom treats a cottage as real 
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treating such chattel as 
personal property or a 
fixture" -
(8) "time, place and degree of 
social, economic and cultural 
development" -
(9) "all other relevant facts 
surrounding the annexation" -
estate; 
unclear what this factor tests; 
liened by a Deed of Trust, no other 
security agreement or financing 
statement, and IFB 's own documents 
refer to the cottage as real property 
collateral. 
(R, 386-395, 421-444, 466, 544-551, 659-662, 675-717.). 
The only evidence that IFB raises to challenge the intent prong is language from the land-
lease agreement that the Bridges had with the State of Idaho. (R. 458-475.) The 2006-08 land 
lease existing at the time the cottage was constructed merely stated that if the lease was 
breached, the State of Idaho could take back the real property and tear down any 
"improvements" not otherwise removed by the Bridges, including the cottage. (R, 459, 466.) 
This lease provision certainly compelled the Bridges to perform their lease but the possible 
draconian consequences of not performing is not evidence that the Bridges objectively intended 
to remove the Cottage from the Property. In fact, by constructing the million dollar Cottage, the 
Bridges (and any other rational person) intended it to be permanently affixed as real property and 
not as a detachable fixture removable from the underlying land if a breach were to occur. 
The objective evidence is not in dispute, that the Bridges intended to affix the Cottage to 
the land so that it was a permanent part of the land. The three factors of the Spencer test are all 
met and summary judgment was properly granted. 
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b. The Parties Contracted For the Cottage to Be Real Property Subject to the Deed of 
Trust. 
IFB also appears to argue that somehow the parties contracted around the Cottage being 
affixed to the land and instead agreed that it would only be considered personal property 
collateral. However, in making that argument, IFB relies upon a contract that was not even 
between the parties. The controlling contract between the parties defining the type of collateral is 
the 2006 Construction Deed of Trust. Importantly, the District Court pointed out that this Deed 
of Trust specifically includes the Cottage as real property collateral: 
Indeed, the Construction Deed of Trust includes "buildings" in its 
definitions of the terms "Real Property" and "Improvements" but does not include 
"buildings" in the definition of the term "Personal Property." (H. Bridges Deel. 
Ex. B at 1, 8.) The cottage surely is a "building" under that term's ordinary 
meaning, making it "Real Property" for purposes of the Construction Deed of 
Trust. Thus, the terms of the Construction Deed of Trust are powerful evidence 
that, at the time it contracted with the Bridges, Idaho First Bank regarded the to-
be-constructed cottage as real property rather than personal property. 
(R, p. 781.) IFB does not dispute that interpretation of the plain language of the 2006 Deed of 
Trust. In addition, IFB does not dispute that all of its internal documents refer to the collateral as 
real property collateral. The Bridges submitted twelve different uncontested examples of internal 
IFB documents admitting that it was treating the cottage as a "residence" and "real property." (R, 
p. 67 5-717.) IFB has failed to submit evidence to challenge those admissions. 
Instead, IFB argues that a 2014 lease between the Bridges and the State of Idaho, which 
referred to the cottage as "personal property," should trump the actual Deed of Trust between the 
Bridges and IFB. Again, the District Court cogently rejected that nonsensical argument: 
The cottage's characterization for purposes of the current lease 1s 
insignificant. There is no reason the cottage could not be characterized as 
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"Personal Property" for purposes of the lease relationship between the Bridges 
and the Idaho Department of Lands yet constitute real property as a matter of 
Idaho law for purposes of the loan relationship between the Bridges and Idaho 
First Bank. 
The Bridges' years-later agreement with the Idaho Department of Lands to 
a renewed lease that characterizes the cottage as "Personal Property" does not 
give rise to a reasonable inference that the Bridges intended, at that point or any 
other, for the cottage to be removed from the cottage site, as might disqualify it 
from having "real property" status as an article "affixed to land." That is true even 
though both the Bridges' original lease and the one to which they last agreed 
identify circumstances in which the Idaho Department of Lands could cause the 
cottage's removal. ... The mere theoretical possibility of removal does not cause 
the cottage to fail the "affixed to land" test, particularly in the absence of any 
evidence the Bridges ever intended or expected removal to occur, as well as in the 
absence of any evidence that removal-and the obvious waste associated with it-
was anything more than a theoretical or remote possibility. 
(R, pp. 780-81.) 
For the reasons discussed above, the Bridges ask this Court to affirm the District Court's 
conclusion that the Cottage and lease were real property not personal property collateral; 
therefore subject to the requirements ofldaho Code§ 45-1503 and-1512. 
2. The Relation Back Doctrine Under IRCP 15 Has No Application. 
A decision to deny application of IRCP 15(c) is a discretionary decision. See, e.g., 
Trimble v. Engelking, 130 Idaho 300, 303, 939 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1997) ("It must therefore be 
determined whether Trimble met the requirements of LR.C.P. 15(c) for amendment of the 
complaint and relation back to the date of the original filing. The decision to grant or deny a 
party's motion to amend a pleading is left to the trial court's discretion, and we will not reverse 
such a ruling absent an abuse of this discretion."). Between the District Court's two 
memorandum decisions, four independent reasons exist explaining its refusal to apply IRCP 
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15(c) and the relation back doctrine to save IFB from its late deficiency claim. The District 
Court's thoroughly reasoned analysis shows that it "acted within the boundaries of this discretion 
and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it." See, 
e.g., Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448,457, 80 P.3d 1049, 1058 (2003) (discussing test for 
abuse of discretion and finding no abuse in denial of Rule 15 motion). 
a. The District Court Properly Applied Its Discretion Regarding the Equities of the 
Relation Back Doctrine As Applied to the Multiple Complaints Filed by IFB. 
The District Court correctly concluded that the relation back doctrine in IRCP 15( c) is 
based in equity, i.e., applied to do equity. See, e.g., Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 418 
(2004) (noting that Rule 15(c) '"has its roots in the former federal equity practice."') (quoting 6A 
Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1496 (2d ed. 1990)). IFB appears to 
concede this point and repeatedly requests that IRCP 15( c) be applied to provide mercy to IFB 
regarding its error in missing the three month deadline in Section 45-1512. 
The District Court then noted how inequitable it would be if IFB were able to avoid the 
statutory deadline for filing a deficiency complaint by relying upon another complaint that was 
also improperly filed in violation ofldaho's deed of trust statutes: 
... [R]elation-back is inappropriate because the original and first amended 
complaints were filed in violation of LC. §45-1503(1). Under that statute, the 
grantor of deed-of-trust collateral is ordinarily not subject to suit before the deed-
of-trust collateral has been sold in accordance with Idaho's deeds-of-trust act, at 
which point a deficiency claim may be asserted under section 45-1512 if the sale 
proceeds do not exhaust the loan balance. Idaho First Bank filed its original and 
first amended complaints before selling the deed-of-trust collateral, in reliance on 
an unsound argument that doing so did not violate section 45-1503(1) because the 
deed-of-trust collateral supposedly was "substantially valueless" under LC. §45-
1503(2) .... That the deed-of-trust collateral was not "substantially valueless" is 
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proved by the $1,200,088 sale price it fetched. 
In any event, because Idaho First Bank violated section 45-1503(1) by filing 
its prior complaints before selling the deed-of-trust collateral, it seems entirely 
inequitable for its belated claim under section 45-1512 to relate back to the prior 
complaints .... The Court sees no good reason to invoke a rule that is designed to 
do equity so as to allow Idaho First Bank's premature filing of suit in violation of 
one provision of Idaho's deeds-of-trust act to excuse its failure to satisfy the filing 
deadline set in another of the act's provisions. 
(R, p. 778.) 
The District Court correctly reasoned that the original two complaints filed by IFB were 
both filed in violation of Idaho statute. As discussed supra, the cottage and lease are real 
property and therefore subject to LC. §45-1503, per its plain language: 
If any obligation secured by a trust deed is breached, the beneficiary may not 
institute a judicial action against the grantor or his successor in interest to 
enforce an obligation owed by the grantor or his successor in interest unless: 
(a) The trust deed has been foreclosed by advertisement and sale in the manner 
provided in this chapter and the judicial action is brought pursuant to section 45-
1512, Idaho Code; or 
(b) The action is one for foreclosure as provided by law for the foreclosure of 
mortgages on real property; or 
(c) The beneficiary's interest in the property covered by the trust deed is 
substantially valueless as defined in subsection (2) of this section, in which case 
the beneficiary may bring an action against the grantor or his successor in interest 
to enforce the obligation owed by grantor or his successor in interest without first 
resorting to the security; or 
( d) The action is one excluded from the meaning of "action" under the provisions 
of section 6-101 (3 ), Idaho Code. 
LC. §45-1503 (emphasis added). 
Unarguably, IFB brought a lawsuit seeking a personal judgment against the Bridges 
despite not having foreclosed the substantial real property collateral, as required by subsection 
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(a). Further, none of the additional exclusions outlined in subsections (b)-(d) apply, which shows 
that the lawsuit pursued by IFB violated LC. §45-1503. 
Thus, it is indisputable that IFB can, at the very most, relate back to a lawsuit it filed in 
violation of§ 45-1503. The District Court properly exercised its discretion in ruling that IFB's 
request under IRCP 15(c) would be an inequitable use of the relation back rule. The use of a 
lawsuit filed in violation of one statute(§ 45-1503) in an attempt to save a second lawsuit filed 
untimely in violation of a second statute (§ 45-1512), is improper. Having properly applied its 
discretion, the District Court's refusal to apply IRCP 15(c) should be upheld on appeal, without 
even needing to consider the three additional reasons given by the District Court. 
b. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Following the Approach of the 
Nevada Supreme Court in Similar Circumstances. 
At the hearing on the original motion for summary judgment, the parties and the District 
Court conceded that they had not uncovered any case law similar to the facts of this case: 
namely, the attempted use of the relation back doctrine to save an untimely deficiency complaint 
by relation back to a foreclosure complaint (even a properly filed one). However, at the hearing 
on the motion to reconsider, the District Court noted that it had found a newly issued case from 
the Nevada Supreme Court that was factually similar. It expressly adopted the reasoning of that 
opinion, which reasoning echoed the arguments raised by the Bridges. (R, pp. 822-23.) 
The case, Badger v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 373 P.3d 89 (Nev. 2016), involved a 
creditor pursuing claims against both a borrower and a guarantor. Under Nevada law, the creditor 
properly filed a lawsuit against the guarantor prior to the foreclosure being completed against the 
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borrower. (Id. at 92.) After the foreclosure, the creditor filed a deficiency lawsuit against the 
borrower within Nevada's statutory anti-deficiency deadline of six-months. (Id.) But Nevada law 
at the time also required a deficiency lawsuit against the guarantor within the same six-month 
deadline. (Id.) The creditor failed to include the guarantor in the deficiency lawsuit filed against 
the borrower and the creditor failed to amend its lawsuit against the guarantor to include the new 
deficiency claim. (Id. at 92-3.) 
The parties then stipulated to consolidate and the creditor filed an amended complaint 
seeking a deficiency judgment against the guarantor. (Id. at 92.) The creditor argued that under 
Nevada's similar rule 15(c), the untimely amended complaint for a deficiency judgment against 
the guarantor should not be barred by the six month deficiency deadline. It contended that it 
could be saved by either the prior guarantor complaint (filed before the foreclosure) or the timely 
deficiency complaint against the borrower. (Id. at 93.) However, the Nevada Supreme Court 
rejected application of the relation back doctrine to either of those prior complaints, stating: 
Consistent with these policy rationales, NRS 40.455 (1) requires that an 
application for a deficiency judgment be made within six months after the date of 
a foreclosure sale.... It follows that a complaint filed prior to a foreclosure sale 
cannot sufficiently put an obligor on notice of a deficiency claim .... As a general 
principle, this court will not interpret statutes so as to render the 
statutory language meaningless. 
We conclude that relation back pursuant to NRCP 15(c) may not be utilized to 
save an untimely application for a deficiency judgment under NRS 40.455(1). We 
emphasized in [previous cases] that the six-month statutory deadline is a rigid 
one, and we reiterate here that a creditor's failure to timely file an application for 
a deficiency judgment per NRS 40.455 is fatal. To permit relation back pursuant 
to NRCP 15( c) in this case would allow creditors to bypass the deadline entirely 
with intentions to amend a pending complaint later. Such an outcome would be 
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inconsistent with Nevada's aim to protect borrowers and guarantors ... and would 
fail to provide guarantors with adequate notice of a deficiency claim ... . 
Id, 373 P.3d at 94-5. The Badger court rejected any "actual notice" exception to the anti-
deficiency statute (since the guarantor had actual notice of an intended deficiency action based 
on the timely deficiency claim brought against the borrower). 
Here, the District Court agreed with that reasoning, "Badger thus furnishes additional 
support for the Court's summary-judgment decision that an amended complaint asserting an 
untimely claim for a deficiency judgment does not relate back to a collection complaint filed 
before foreclosure, in violation of Idaho's 'one action' rule." (R., p. 823.) 
IFB tries to distinguish the Badger case, but incorrectly asserts that the opinion is only 
applicable to situations where a party (guarantor) is trying to use the relation back doctrine based 
upon a complaint filed by a different party (borrower). IFB overlooks the important fact that the 
guarantor also had its own complaint filed prior to the foreclosure and was trying to relate back 
to that complaint as well. The Badger court specifically addressed that issue: "It follows that a 
complaint filed prior to a foreclosure sale cannot sufficiently put an obligor on notice of a 
deficiency claim .... To permit relation back pursuant to NRCP 15(c) in this case would allow 
creditors to bypass the deadline entirely with intentions to amend a pending complaint later." 
373 P.3d at 95. 
The Badger case is directly on point and illustrates all of the practical reasons why the 
relation back doctrine should not be applied to circumvent an anti-deficiency statute. The District 
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Court properly applied its discretion in adopting that reasoning for denying application of IRCP 
15(c). 
c. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Concluding that the 
Deficiency Action Does Not Arise Out of the Conduct, Transaction, or 
Occurrence Set Out in the Initial Complaints Filed Prior to the Foreclosure Sale. 
The District Court also concluded that, for purposes of IRCP 15(c)(l)(B), a deficiency 
claim does not arise "out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence" of a complaint filed prior to 
a foreclosure sale. (R, p. 776.) The District Court rightly concluded that a deficiency claim arises 
only after a foreclosure sale and, thus, cannot be said to arise out of any "conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence" that predates the foreclosure. (Id. ("The section 45-1512 claim arose out of the sale 
of the deed-of-trust collateral for less than the loan's balance, not out of the Bridges' loan 
default. Indeed, had everything else been the same but the sale proceeds equaled or exceeded the 
loan balance, no deficiency claim would have ever arisen, despite the Bridges' loan default."); 
"Where, by way of amendment, a party is setting forth a new cause of action, it does not relate 
back" and allegations "arising at a different time and with regard to a different set of facts" must 
be considered a new cause of action; see also Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 269-71, 688 P.2d 
1172, 1174-76 (1984) (citing 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1497, pp. 
489-492 (1971)); Black Canyon Racquetball Club v. Idaho First Nat'! Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 
171, 178, 804 P.2d 900, 907 (1991) (stating that "the new claims relied in part upon new facts 
not alleged in the original complaint").) 
The District Court further relied upon long-standing U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth 
Circuit precedent that if a claim has not yet "accrued" at the time of the original pleading, then 
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that original pleading cannot be used to save the claim from a deadline that only arose and fully 
ran after the claim accrued. See United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 
U.S. 157, 164 (1914) ("[I]t is elementary that an amendment dates bank to the filing of the 
petition, and is to supply defects in the cause of action then existing, or at most to bring into the 
suit grounds of action which existed at the beginning of the case. In this case there was no cause 
of action to amend. Nor was the amendment of January 9, 1911, the introduction of a new cause 
of action existing at the beginning of the suit."); United States ex rel. Wulff v. CMA, Inc., 890 
F.2d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing McCord in refusing to permit relation-back of an 
amended complaint asserting "a Miller Act claim which the Wulffs did not have when they filed 
their original complaint"). The District Court further explained: 
It seems counterintuitive to apply Rule 15(c)'s relation-back doctrine in a way 
that causes any claim, including a deficiency claim, to relate back to a date earlier 
than the date on which the claim accrued. Indeed, a claim does not truly exist 
before it accrues. Had Idaho First Bank asserted a deficiency claim when it filed 
the prior complaints, that claim would have been subject to dismissal because it 
had not yet accrued and, depending on the sale price ultimately obtained for the 
collateral, might never accrue. 
(R, pp. 776-77.) 
Now, to counter those arguments, IFB cites to numerous cases that are not instructive 
because they fail to include any claims that accrued after the original pleading and after the 
"conduct, transaction, or occurrence" that is supposedly the basis for relation back. IFB cites 
cases under 15(d) that involve after-arising claims that are timely filed, only questioning whether 
they would be included in the same lawsuit as prior claims. IFB cites Security Insurance Co. v. 
United States ex rel. Haydis, 338 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1964), even though the 9th Circuit in Wulff 
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already pointed out the distinction: the claim had already accrued at the time of the original 
pleading and the original pleading contained the full claim; the only deficiency was that the 
original pleading was filed prior to a waiting period expiring. IFB also cites numerous cases 
involving claims that were not pled in the original pleading but could have been pled in that 
original pleading and, therefore, were allowed to be added through Rule 15( c ). 
In fact, none of the cases cited by IFB address the particulars of this case: an amended 
pleading that adds a claim that (1) had not accrued and did not exist at the time of the original 
pleadings; (2) could not have properly been pled in the original pleadings; (3) accrued several 
months after the original pleadings; ( 4) is trying to be saved by original pleadings that were filed 
in violation of statute and should be dismissed; and (5) if saved by the original pleadings would 
completely eviscerate the protections of Idaho's anti-deficiency statute (since a foreclosure 
complaint could then always be filed prematurely as a means to avoid the three month deadline). 
The District Court properly determined that none of the cases cited by IFB were on point like the 
Texas Portland Cement case from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Wulff case from the 9th Circuit, 
and the recent Badger case out of Nevada. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that a deficiency claim does not accrue until after a foreclosure sale and the relation back 
doctrine is not applied to save claims that have not accrued at the time of the original pleading. 
d. The District Court Had Additional Compelling Reasons It Could Have Used to 
Reject Application of the Relation Back Doctrine to These Facts. 
The District Court discussed four reasons for rejecting the relation back doctrine as 
applied to the facts of this case. Surely, the District Court could have relied upon at least four 
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additional reasons. (R, 755.) Thus, even if this Court determines the District Court's reasoning 
was in error, this Court may utilize those additional reasons to sustain the District Court. See, 
e.g., Edged in Stone, Inc. v. Nw. Power Sys., LLC, 156 Idaho 176,181,321 P.3d 726, 731 (2014) 
('"Where the lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm 
the order on the correct theory.' ... We affirm the district court's order granting summary 
judgment ... because it reached the correct result, although by a different theory."). 
First, the relation back doctrine has no application here because it would be used to 
eviscerate the plain meaning of LC. § 45-1512 and its three month deadline. (R, pp. 729-731.) 
The statute is plain: "At any time within 3 months after any sale under a deed of trust, as 
hereinbefore provided, a money judgment may be sought for the balance due upon the obligation 
for which such deed of trust was given as security .... " LC. § 45-1512 (emphasis added). The 
statute specifically states that the deficiency action must be brought "after" the sale under the 
deed of trust and within "3 months." IFB is arguing it can get around that timing by filing two 
complaints that are both outside that specific three month window. IFB is seeking to avoid the 
plain meaning of the statute, which it cannot do. Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of 
Equalization, 157 Idaho 180, 184, 335 P.3d 25, 29 (2014) ("The objective of statutory 
interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent."); J & M Cattle Co. v. Farmers [653] Nat. 
Bank, 156 Idaho 690, 694, 330 P.3d 1048, 1052 (2014) ("Statutory interpretation begins with an 
examination of the literal words of a statute."); Am. Bank v. Wadsworth Golf Constr. Co. of the 
Sw., 155 Idaho 186, 191, 307 P.3d 1212, 1217 (2013) ("When the statutory language is 
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and the 
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Court need not consider rules of statutory construction."). The Badger court similarly addressed 
this point, "As a general principle, this court will not interpret statutes so as to render the 
statutory language meaningless." 373 P.3d at 94. 
Second, if IFB's application of the relation back doctrine is correct, it would completely 
remove the protections LC. § 45-1512 is intended to provide borrowers: an expedited resolution 
of any potential deficiency claim. (R, p. 731.) Apparently, in IFB's world, any creditor 
contemplating the sale of property secured by a deed of trust can file a complaint at any time 
prior to the sale of the collateral, forever protecting creditors from satisfying the required "3 
months" post-sale deadline in LC. § 45-1512. Based on IFB's logic, creditors would be able to 
file a deficiency claim any time after the sale of the collateral and it will always "relate back" to 
that original complaint. If this is the law, then every creditor will take this approach to protect 
themselves and eliminate any three month deadline. The Badger Court recognized this problem: 
"To permit relation back pursuant to NRCP 15(c) in this case would allow creditors to bypass the 
deadline entirely with intentions to amend a pending complaint later. Such an outcome would be 
inconsistent with Nevada's aim to protect borrowers ... and would fail to provide ... adequate 
notice of a deficiency claim .... " 373 P.3d at 95. 
Third, LC. § 45-1512 is a statute of repose and cannot be circumvented by the relation 
back doctrine. (R, 726-29, 757-63.) The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that equitable doctrines 
like estoppel or tolling can be used to extend a statute of limitation and save an otherwise 
untimely claim but cannot be used to extend a statute of repose: 
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Statutes of limitations, but not statutes of repose, are subject to equitable tolling, a 
doctrine that "pauses the running of, or 'tolls,' a statute of limitations when a litigant 
has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary circumstance prevents him 
from bringing a timely action." Statutes of repose, on the other hand, generally may 
not be tolled, even in cases of extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiffs 
control. ... [A] 'critical distinction' between statutes of limitations and statutes of 
repose 'is that a repose period is fixed and its expiration will not be delayed by 
estoppel or tolling."' 
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2183 & 2187 (2014) (emphasis added). 
Persuasive case law has extended that holding to also include Rule 15 amendments, i.e. 
estoppel, tolling, and Rule 15 amendments cannot be used to extend a statute of repose or 
otherwise save a claim filed after the statute of repose has run. The logic is that equitable and 
procedural rules cannot be used to extend a statute of repose that contains a substantive right that 
on a fixed day the defendant will be free from any further claim. See, e.g., Police & Fire Ret. 
Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 110 (2d Cir. 2013) (when a claim is 
commenced after the statute of repose has run, "the Rule 15(c) 'relation back' doctrine does not 
permit members of a putative class, who are not named parties, to intervene in the class action as 
named parties in order to revive claims that were dismissed from the class complaint for want of 
jurisdiction"); In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 800 F. Supp. 2d 477, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) ("[A]s a number of courts have stated, the Rule 15(c) relation back doctrine does not apply 
to statutes of repose."); Miguel v. Country Funding Corp, 309 F .3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2002); 
USM Corp. v. GKN Fasteners Ltd., 578 F.2d 21, 22 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that "Rule 15 is not 
to be viewed as enlarging or restricting federal jurisdiction. The doctrine of relating back in time 
to the original pleadings does not affect the jurisdiction of the district court here in any 
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manner."); Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Olson, 768 F. Supp. 283, 284-86 (D. Ariz. 1991) (finding that 
deficiency action was barred by the 90-day statute because "where the statutory time limitation is 
part of the substantive right, Rule 15(c) does not apply to relate back an untimely complaint."). 
Idaho's deficiency statute is a statute ofrepose for two main reasons: (1) it acts to shorten 
and trump the normal statute of limitation for a claim on the underlying promissory note; and (2) 
it is focused on finality rather than stale claims. Here, the statute of limitation on a promissory 
note claim in Idaho is five years, but this three-month deficiency statute acts independent of that 
limitation period (as is typical of a statute of repose) and can therefore significantly shorten a 
time period the purpose of which is to prevent the filing of claims before the facts become stale, 
e.g. witnesses' memories fade, witnesses die, or physical evidence is lost or misplaced. No one 
could reasonably argue that a three-month deficiency deadline was intended to preclude stale 
claims; rather its purpose (and the main purpose of all statutes of repose) is to create almost 
immediate closure for the debtor after sale of the real property collateral. The statute gives the 
creditor only three months to either assert further liability or the debtor gets a fresh start and 
freedom from liability. See CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2183 (2014) ("Statutes of 
repose also encourage plaintiffs to bring actions in a timely manner, and for many of the same 
reasons [as a statute of limitation]. But the rationale has a different emphasis. Statutes of repose 
effect a legislative judgment that a defendant should 'be free from liability after the legislatively 
determined period of time."' (quoting C. J. S. §7, at 24 and also citing case law that compared 
the statute ofrepose to a bankruptcy discharge and fresh start)). 
Thus, Idaho's deficiency statute should be found to be a statute of repose wherein the 
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legislature granted a substantive right to debtors. Debtors are protected from further litigation if 
nothing is filed during the three months after the foreclosure sale, "even in cases of extraordinary 
circumstances beyond a plaintiffs control," and certainly in this situation where IFB has only 
itself to blame for failing to bring a timely deficiency action. See W Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Gem 
State Lumber Co., 32 Idaho 497, 501, 185 P. 554, 555 (1919). 
Finally, as part of the equitable considerations under IRCP 15(c), it is important to note 
that there is no reason to expand Rule 15( c) to apply to this case. A creditor has three months to 
file a deficiency claim, per a clearly written and long-existing statute, and the creditor's failure to 
meet that deadline does not merit a new expansion of IRCP 15( c) to protect the creditor from its 
own negligence. See, e.g, In re Riverview Prods., 34 F. Supp. 482, 484-85 (W.D.N.Y. 1940) 
("Section 1083 further makes available to the creditor an opportunity to establish this difference, 
if the creditor feels that the debt has not been satisfied upon the sale of the security, by applying 
to the foreclosure court, within a ninety day period, for a deficiency judgment, upon proof as to 
value of the security. If, for some reason, the creditor chooses not to so apply, that is no concern 
of the Legislature or of this Court."); Haines Pipeline Constr., Inc. v. Exline Gas Sys., 921 P.2d 
955, 960-61 (Okl. Ct. App. 1996) ("FDIC's failure to timely seek a deficiency judgment after the 
sale of the mortgaged premises operated to satisfy Exline's debt."); Citrus State Bank v. 
McKendrick, 215 Cal. App. 3d 941, 948-49, 263 Cal. Rptr. 781, 786 (1989) ("However, the 
language of section 580a could not be clearer. It states that any action for a deficiency judgment 
'must be brought within three months' of the foreclosure sale. Given the mandate of section 
580a, an action brought more than three months after the sale, as is the case here, is subject to 
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dismissal as untimely."). 
For all of the reasons stated above, IFB's attempted use of the relation back doctrine is 
incorrect and its untimely deficiency claim is barred. The District Court's ruling should be 
affirmed. 
VI. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPELLANT'S APPEAL 
A. Standard of Review of Order Dated December 15, 2016. 
The issue of a District Court's jurisdiction to address issues like claim preclusion during 
the pendency of an appeal is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. See e.g., Slavens 
v. Slavens, 384 P.3d 962, 965 (Idaho 2016) ("[T]he issue of whether a district court has subject 
matter jurisdiction is a question of law, over which we exercise free review."). Similarly, 
whether claim preclusion bars litigation or arbitration is a question of law that this Court reviews 
de novo. See Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 122, 157 P.3d 613, 616 (2007) ("Whether 
claim preclusion or issue preclusion bars relitigation between the same parties of a prior 
litigation is a question of law upon which this Court exercises free review."); see also 
Shackelfordv. State, 160 Idaho 317,322,372 P.3d 372,377 (2016). The waiver of a party's right 
to rely on an arbitration clause and therefore the subject matter jurisdiction of the District Court 
is a legal issue that this Court reviews de novo. See Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 77-79, 
205 P.3d 1209, 1213-15 (2009). 
B. The Idaho Supreme Court, And Not An Arbitrator, Should Resolve the Cross-
Collateralization Issue. 
The District Court presided over litigation between the Bridges and IFB that lasted for 
more than a year. From December 18, 2015, to August 1, 2016, that litigation centered on IFB's 
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alleged claim to a deficiency owing on the 2006 Cottage Note. In that litigation, the Bridges 
specifically asked the District Court to rule that such a deficiency claim was "forever 
dismiss[ ed]" and "IFB is forever barred :from seeking any deficiency on the [2006 Cottage] 
Note." (R. pp. 530, 532.) Ultimately, the District Court entered a judgment dismissing with 
prejudice IFB's lawsuit to recover a deficiency judgment on the 2006 Cottage Note. IFB brought 
this appeal to challenge that final judgment of dismissal. 
However, shortly after filing this appeal, IFB commenced a new and concurrent effort in 
a new forum to recover its same claimed deficiency owing on the 2006 Cottage Note. IFB's 
arbitration action focuses on foreclosing a different piece of collateral (the Bridges' Boise home) 
in order to recover the same alleged deficiency on the 2006 Cottage Note to which it was 
previously "forever barred." IFB claimed that a cross-collateralization agreement allowed 
recovery of the claimed deficiency on the 2006 Cottage Note notwithstanding the final Judgment 
dismissing that deficiency claim with prejudice. The claim is was an obvious collateral attack on 
the District Court's final Judgment. 
The Bridges were forced to ask the District Court (the seemingly logical choice) to stop 
the arbitration and apply res judicata to bar a new action to recover the same claimed 2006 
Cottage Note deficiency. The Bridges pointed out that this cross-collateralization argument could 
have, and should have, been raised before the District Court and was now barred by claim 
preclusion. 
Surprisingly, the District Court declined to stop the arbitration and declined to address the 
res judicata or other substantive issues related to this cross-collateralization argument. Therefore, 
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the Bridges filed their cross-appeal because they contend a collateral attack on a final Judgment 
should be resolved by the Courts, not an arbitrator. 
1. The District Court Erred By Claiming No Jurisdictional Authority to Address 
the Recovery of a Deficiency Claim Through a Cross-Collateralization Provision. 
The District Court decided that it did not have jurisdiction to address the substantive issue 
raised by the Bridges. The Bridges ask whether IFB can forcibly switch forums to an arbitrator 
and get a second chance to recover a deficiency on the 2006 Cottage Note despite IFB already 
litigating with the Bridges to a final Judgment related to a claimed deficiency on the 2006 
Cottage Note and despite the final Judgment dismissing with prejudice IFB's deficiency 
complaint. The District Court ruled that IFB's appeal of the final Judgment limited the District 
Court's jurisdiction so that it could not substantively address the Bridges' motion to stop that 
arbitration and substantively address IFB' s collateral attack on the final Judgment. The District 
Court committed legal error here in improperly interpreting its jurisdictional limits. The District 
Court had jurisdiction to address those crucial questions notwithstanding the pendency of IFB' s 
appeal. 
The Bridges asked the District Court to stop the arbitration and address the substantive 
issue of IFB's new argument for recovering a deficiency on the 2006 Cottage Note, believing the 
District Court to be the obvious and most logical court to address the issue. The District Court 
had just spent fifteen months presiding over litigation between IFB and the Bridges regarding the 
2006 Cottage Note, and twelve of those months was spent presiding over whether the Bridges 
could recover a deficiency on that 2006 Cottage Note. The District Court had just issued a final 
38 
Judgment and two Memorandum Decisions resolving that deficiency dispute. 
Certainly, if no appeal had been filed, then the District Court (and arguably, the District 
Court in Valley County) would have had jurisdiction to address the issues of: stopping the forum 
shopping and a second bite at the apple through arbitration; enforcing the "litigation" exception 
to arbitration; and applying claim preclusion and the bar rule from the final Judgment. It, 
therefore, made no logical sense that the District Court would no longer be able to address these 
issues merely because IFB had filed an appeal. It made no logical sense that IFB would be able 
to protect its forum shopping to arbitration and its collateral attack on the final Judgment merely 
by filing an appeal prior to or during that arbitration action. 
Jurisdiction seemed clear. The District Court and the Bridges both identified Idaho 
Appellate Rule 13 addressing the jurisdiction of the District Court during appeals to this Court, 
but applied them differently. The District Court said: "Because Idaho First Bank's appeal is 
pending, the Court lacks unfettered jurisdiction over this action. The jurisdiction it has is 
prescribed by I.A.R. 13(b)." The Bridges pointed to two provisions that each provided broad 
language where jurisdiction would seem to be obvious: I.A.R. 13(b)(6), which incorporates the 
provisions ofl.R.C.P. 60(b)(l) or 60(b)(6) regarding "relief from a final judgment" for "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" and for "any other reason that justifies relief'; and 
I.A.R. 13(b)(13), which allows the District Court to "Take any action or enter any order required 
for the enforcement of any judgment or order." All of these provisions provided substantial room 
for the District Court to exercise jurisdiction over these important issues. Idaho does not appear 
to have any case law interpreting the meaning of these jurisdictional provisions or limiting their 
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scope, and the District Court did not cite any cases as controlling or persuasive. 
In addition, the Bridges argued that the District Court had inherent authority to address 
these issues directly, as implicating its work during the last fifteen months and especially its final 
Judgment. Certainly the intent of these jurisdictional provisions appears to be to grant the 
District Court the ability to address questions and issues with practicality and efficiency, rather 
than binding the District Court's hands: "unless prohibited by order of the Supreme Court, the 
district court shall have the power and authority to rule upon the following motions and to take 
the following actions during the pendency on an appeal." Here, no Supreme Court order 
prohibited the District Court from addressing these issues under the broad language of I.R.C.P. 
60(b)(l), I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), and/or I.A.R. 13(b)(l3). 
In addition, it is difficult to understand how the District Court would lack "inherent" 
jurisdiction during the appeal to address the related issues of (1) IFB' s waiver of its right to 
arbitration based on its litigation of the same or substantially similar issue, and (2) the claim 
preclusive effect of its judgment. If an appeal strips the District Court of this jurisdiction, then 
that would result in improper use of an appeal in order to facilitate forum shopping, i.e. solely 
because of the appeal, the Bridges are forced to proceed in an arbitration that would otherwise be 
barred by the District Court. That result lacks logic. 
The District Court had jurisdiction, under I.A.R. 13(b), or inherently, to address the 
substantive issues regarding IFB's attempt to use arbitration to get around the District Court's 
final Judgment. The District Court committed legal error in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to 
address the Bridges' motion. 
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2. Claim Preclusion Arising Out of District Court's Final Judgment on Cottage 
Note Deficiency Claim Should Prevent the New Argument of Cross-
Collateralization Provision. 
With jurisdiction a non-issue, the real question is whether the District Court committed 
error by failing to apply claim preclusion. The District Court failed to even expressly address the 
issue in its written order. The District Court only ruled: 
Idaho First Bank didn't waive its right to arbitration under the 2008 loan 
documents, including the 2008 collateral instrument with the "cross-
collateralization clause" at issue, by litigating this action. Thus, even ifthere were 
no jurisdictional impediment to granting the requested relief, the Court wouldn't 
grant it. The arbitrator can decide whether Idaho First Bank has the right to collect 
the remaining balance of the 2006 loan through resort to the collateral for the 
2008 loan. 
(R, p. 960.) That analysis failed to address the principles of claim preclusion that should have 
prevented IFB from collaterally attacking the final Judgment through a new arbitration 
proceeding. 
Idaho law is clear that claim preclusion has broad scope to preclude subsequent litigation 
or arbitration about issues that could and should have been raised: 
Claim preclusion bars adjudication not only on the matters offered and 
received to defeat the claim, but also as to "every matter which might and should 
have been litigated in the first suit." In other words, when a valid, final judgment 
is rendered in a proceeding, it "extinguishes all claims arising out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." This 
Court has noted that the "transactional concept of a claim is broad" and that claim 
preclusion "may apply even where there, is not a substantial overlap between the 
theories advanced in support of a claim, or in the evidence relating to those 
theories." 
Ticor Title v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 126, 157 P.3d 613, 620 (2007); State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 
55, 63,343 P.3d 497,505 (2015) ("[r]esjudicata's preclusive effect bars 'not only subsequent re-
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litigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent re-litigation of any claims.relating 
to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made' in the 
first suit."); Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 437, 849 P.2d 107, 108 
(1993) ("[T]he transactional concept of a claim is broad, and ... the bar of claim preclusion is 
similarly broad .... [T]he bar of claim preclusion may apply even where there is not a substantial 
overlap between the theories advanced in support of a claim, or in the evidence relating to those 
theories."); see also Restat. 2d of Judgments, § 24 (2nd 1982) ("Dimensions of 'Claim' for 
Purposes of Merger or Bar -- General Rule Concerning 'Splitting': When a valid and final 
judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiffs claim pursuant to the rules of merger 
or bar . . . the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the 
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, 
out of which the action arose."); Restat 2d of Judgments, § 25 (2nd 1982) ("Exemplifications of 
General rule Concerning Splitting: The rule of § 24 applies to extinguish a claim by the plaintiff 
against the defendant even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action (1) To present 
evidence or grounds or theories of the case not presented in the first action, or (2) To seek 
remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first action."). 
Res judicata, both claim and issue preclusion, is applicable during an appeal of the final 
Judgment at issue. See, e.g., Restat 2d of Judgments, § 13, cmt. f (2nd 1982) ("The better view is 
that a judgment otherwise final remains so despite the taking of an appeal unless what is called 
an appeal actually consists of a trial de novo .... ") Gilbert v. State, 119 Idaho 684, 686, 809 P.2d 
1163, 1165 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting Supreme Court looks to Restatement Second of Judgments 
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on issues of res judicata but ultimately not reaching issue regarding its application during the 
pendency of an appeal); Roberts v. Hollandsworth, 101 Idaho 522, 524 n.5, 616 P.2d 1058, 1060 
(1980) (noting "that the pendency of an appeal does not suspend operation of an otherwise final 
federal court judgment as res judicata within the federal system .... "); Sacks v. Reader (In re 
Reader), 183 B.R. 630, 633-34 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995) (concluding that Idaho courts would 
enforce res judicata principles during pendency of an appeal). 
IFB already had its full opportunity to raise the cross-collateralization argument. In this 
litigation, IFB raised a claim that it could recover a deficiency balance under the Cottage Note. 
On January 20, 2016, the Bridges filed their motion for summary judgment to dismiss the 
deficiency action and permanently eliminate any claim for any further debt owing on the Cottage 
Note. Thus, IFB was obligated to then raise any and all its arguments to support its claim for that 
deficiency. See Ticor Title, 144 Idaho at 126, 157 P.3d at 620 ("every matter which might and 
should have been litigated in the first suit"); Restat 2d of Judgments, § 24 (2nd 1982) ("That a 
number of different legal theories casting liability on an actor may apply to a given episode does 
not create multiple transactions and hence multiple claims. This remains true although the 
several legal theories depend on different shadings of the facts, or would emphasize different 
elements of the facts, or would call for different measures of liability or different kinds of 
relief."). 
However, 1TB raised only two arguments below - IRCP 15's relation back doctrine and 
Article Nine - and chose to not then raise its third argument, first presented to the arbitrator - the 
cross-collateralization provision. IFB never mentioned its argument that this claimed deficiency 
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could be recovered against the Bridges' Boise home even if the deficiency action was barred 
under I. C. § 45-1512. IFB chose to keep silent on this issue, although IFB was perfectly able to 
raise the argument, and nothing prevented IFB from making the argument as all necessary facts 
supporting this theory had already occurred. See, e.g., AgStar Fin. Servs., ACA v. Nw. Sand & 
Gravel, Inc., 161 Idaho 801,391 P.3d 1271, 1282 (2017) ("[W] here a creditor forecloses against 
a portion of its security and obtains a deficiency judgment, it cannot then seek to recover against 
the additional security that was not sought in the first instance.") 
IFB forced the Bridges to first litigate for eight months to prevail on dismissing the 
deficiency action. Then, only after losing, did IFB raise this additional argument about the cross-
collateralization provision for the first time. During the entirety of the litigation in this case, IFB 
never mentioned this alternative position. IFB should have raised this argument long ago, rather 
than splitting its claims in violation of res judicata principles. IFB chose not to raise its cross-
collateralization argument with the District Court and now IFB should have to live with that 
decision. Parties do not get to split their claims in order to preserve two different bites at the 
apple. 
Instead, IFB collaterally attacks the District Court's rulings by asking the arbitrator to 
contradict and undermine the District Court's rulings regarding IFB's attempt to recover a 
deficiency on the Cottage Note. The District Court already concluded that any deficiency claim 
on the Cottage Note is dismissed with prejudice because it was untimely filed. Having lost that 
issue and apparently conceding it expected to also lose the issue on appeal, IFB went to a 
different forum with an arbitrator hoping that the arbitrator would undermine the District Court's 
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Judgment. IFB was asking the arbitrator to find that a non-existent deficiency on the Cottage 
Note can still be recovered by foreclosing on the Bridges' Boise home. Rather than ask the 
District Court to address this argument, IFB went around the District Court and asked an 
arbitrator to decide the issue. 
The District Court should have applied claim preclusion to bar this new arbitration 
proceeding. The District Court is the correct forum to interpret Idaho's claim preclusion law and 
apply its impact on its own final Judgment. See, e.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Glick, 
151 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 1998) (preclusive effect of prior judgments is a matter to be resolved 
by courts, not arbitrators); In re Y & A Group Sec. Litigation, 38 F.3d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1994) 
("The district court, and not the arbitration panel, is the best interpreter of its own judgment."); 
Bryan Cty. v. Yates Paving & Grading Co., 638 S.E.2d 302, 304-05 (Ga. 2006) ("The principle 
stated ... is that 'even when arbitration is involved ... 'courts should not have to stand by while 
parties re-assert claims that have already been resolved.' 'No matter what, courts have the power 
to defend their judgments as res judicata, including the power to enjoin or stay subsequent 
arbitrations."') (internal citations omitted); C & 0 Dev. Co. v. American Arbitration Ass 'n, 48 
N.C. App. 548,552,269 S.E.2d 685,687 (1980) ('the extent of a judgment's binding effect is a 
matter for judicial determination').2 
2 IFB argues that Judge Scott properly refused to address the claim preclusion effect of his judgment because res 
judicata issues, including claim preclusion, should be resolved by the arbitrator and not by the courts. IFB cites to 
the Storey Construction case. In Storey Construction, the district court held that the arbitrability of res judicata 
issues should be resolved by the district court and not by the arbitrator. Storey Construction, Inc. v. Hanks, 148 
Idaho 401, 405-407, 224 P.3d 468, 472-474 (2009) . That issue was not properly appealed, so the Idaho Supreme 
· Court never reached the issue. Id 
In dicta, the Idaho Supreme Court did mention the issue and appeared to indicate that the arbitrator (not the 
court) should resolve issues ofres judicata where "[t]here is nothing in the parties' contract excluding the defense of 
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The District Court's Judgment means that any further arguments that amounts are still 
owed on the Cottage Note and recoverable against any of the Bridges' assets are now precluded 
( claim preclusion). This Court should correct the District Court's legal error regarding the 
ramifications of claim preclusion, confirming that the District Court's final Judgment fully 
addressed all arguments for recovering on the Cottage Note and IFB's untimely third argument 
about a cross-collateralization provision is now barred. 
C. Cross-Collateralization Provision Cannot Be Used to Revive Deficiency Claim 
Already Properly Dismissed With Prejudice Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 45-1512. 
Claim preclusion should prevent IFB's collateral attack on the District Court's final 
judgment. However, even if claim preclusion is inapplicable to bar IFB's cross-collateralization 
argument, the District Court erred by leaving this issue for the arbitrator to resolve. IFB chose to 
drag the Bridges into litigation for a total of fifteen months in District Court regarding the 2006 
Cottage Note. After losing repeatedly in that litigation before the District Court, IFB should not 
res judicata from their agreement to arbitrate." 148 Idaho at 406, 224 P.3d at 473, n.l. That footnote, however, as 
stated, is dicta. Idaho has no binding precedent regarding whether Judge Scott or this arbitrator should address the 
res judicata impact of Judge Scott's final judgment. 
There is extensive case law to support the proposition that when a court presides over litigation that results 
in a judgment that then is potentially relevant to a subsequent arbitration demand, the Court (not the arbitrator) 
should be the person to decide the res judicata impact of that judgment and whether it bars arbitration. In another 
footnote, the Idaho Supreme Court quoted a Ninth Circuit case for the proposition that "[A] res judicata objection 
based on a prior arbitration proceeding is a legal defense that, in turn, is a component of the dispute on the merits 
and must be considered by the arbitrator, not the court." Storey Construction, 148 Idaho at 406, 224 P.3d at 473, n.1 
(emphasis added.) That case involves a decision about the res judicata impact between two arbitration proceedings. 
That scenario is materially different from the res judicata impact between a judicial proceeding and a subsequent 
arbitration. The Ninth Circuit therein cites John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Glick, 151 F.3d, 132, 137, 
138 (1998), where the Third Circuit found that "federal courts must protect the thought and integrity of prior 
judgments," a view supported by the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, which have specifically found 
that there is a material difference when the res judicata effect of a state or federal judgment is at issue (rather than a 
prior arbitration award). 
Thus, this Court should follow the logic outlined above, finding that Judge Scott and the appellate courts 
are the proper forums to address the question of whether res judicata bars arbitration, and find that Judge Scott's 
final judgment and the doctrine of claim preclusion does bar further arbitration of a deficiency claim. 
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have been allowed to change the forum to arbitration to test alternative or additional theories. As 
a matter of law, IFB waived its right to rely upon any arbitration provision in seeking to recover 
first under the 2006 Cottage Note. As a matter of law, the District Court, not the arbitrator, had 
· subject matter jurisdiction over the 2006 Cottage Note and recovery of any deficiency on that 
Note. The District Court should have forced IFB to finish any remaining litigation regarding the 
2006 Cottage Note in District Court. 
1. IFB is Prevented From Changing the Forum to Arbitration to Relitigate the Key 
Issue of Recovery of a Deficiency on the 2006 Cottage Note. 
Ninth Circuit case law (and apparently uniform across all state and federal jurisdictions) 
is that arbitration demands cannot be used as a second bite of the apple or after a party has 
significantly litigated an issue in district court. See Martin v. Yasuda, 829 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 
2016) ("[P]laintiffs have shown prejudice here because, should this case go to arbitration, they 
would have to relitigate a key legal issue on which the district court has ruled in their favor. We 
and other circuits routinely have found this factor dispositive because the plaintiffs would be 
prejudiced if the defendants got a mulligan on a legal issue it chose to litigate in court and lost."); 
Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 78-79, 205 P.3d 1209, 1214-15 (2009); Hansen v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 670-71, 735 P.2d 974, 981-82 (1987) ("The policy 
underlying the enforcement of arbitration agreements or provisions in a written contract is 
rendered meaningless when the parties to such agreements proceed with the litigation process .... 
In short, when it appeared that things were not going its way, State Farm wanted out of the 
litigation process." (Internal citations omitted)). 
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The District Court (not an arbitrator) is responsible for deciding the issue of waiver. See 
Martin v. Yasuda, 829 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2016) ("We have made clear that waiver by litigation 
conduct is part of the first category of gateway issues .... Accordingly ... the question before us 
is presumptively for a court and not an arbitrator to decide. Every circuit that has addressed this 
issue-whether a district court or an arbitrator should decide if a party waived its right to 
arbitrate through litigation conducted before the district court-has reached the same 
conclusion."); Borah, 147 Idaho at 78-79, 205 P.3d at 1214-15 (affirming district court retaining 
jurisdiction despite arbitration demand because arbitration waived by litigation); Hansen, 112 
Idaho at 670-71, 735 P.2d at 981-82 (affirming district court finding waiver of arbitration). 
The District Court erred in not applying this waiver doctrine. The District Court did 
exactly what Idaho and Ninth Circuit law has said is prohibited: allowing IFB to switch the 
forum to arbitration seeking to litigate about the 2006 Cottage Note after litigating it for fifteen 
months in District Court, where it received an unfavorable ruling. This constitutes legal error. If 
claim preclusion was not applicable - and the Bridges certainly believe it is - then the District 
Court (not an arbitrator) should have concluded the litigation between IFB and the Bridges by 
addressing the substance ofIFB's cross-collateralization argument. 
2. This Court Should Dismiss IFB's Cross-Collateralization Argument. 
Though the District Court erred and did not reach the substance of IFB's cross-
collateralization argument, this Court can still reach the legal issue, which was raised and fully 
briefed below, thereby most efficiently resolving this issue by avoiding a remand on this 
substantive issue. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 92 n.99, 105 S. Ct. 1785, 1791 
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(1985) ("When the nonconstitutional questions have not been passed on by the lower court, we 
may vacate the decision below and remand with instructions that those questions be decided, or 
we may choose to decide those questions ourselves without benefit of lower court analysis. The 
choice between these options depends on the extent to which lower court factfinding and analysis 
of the nonconstitutional questions will be necessary or useful to our disposition of those 
questions." (Internal citations omitted)); Mort v. United States, 86 F.3d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1996) 
("In this case, the facts are undisputed and further fact finding is unnecessary . . .. Thus, we can 
determine as easily as the district court ... and we exercise our discretion to do so."); Marsoner 
v. United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 40 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that 
"the record is sufficiently developed and ... remand is unnecessary"); Me inhold v. United States 
DOD, 34 F.3d 1469, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that "further factfinding is unnecessary 
and we can determine as easily as the district court"); Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway District, 
135 Idaho 322, 17 P.3d 266 (2000) (reversing summary judgment for condemnor and entering 
summary judgment for property owner on facts before it). 
IFB claims that it can foreclose on the Bridges' Boise home to recover the deficiency that 
was previously dismissed with prejudice, relying on the following language in a Deed of Trust 
on the Bridges' home: 
CROSS-COLLATERALIZATION. In addition to the Credit Agreement, this Deed of 
Trust secures all obligations, debts and liabilities, plus interest thereon, of [the 
Bridges] to [IFB], ... whether now existing or hereafter arising, whether related or 
unrelated to the purpose of the Credit Agreement, whether voluntary or otherwise, 
whether due or not due, direct or indirect, determined or undetermined, absolute or 
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, whether Grantor may be liable individually or 
jointly with others, whether obligated as guarantor, surety, accommodation party or 
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otherwise and whether recovery upon such amounts may be or hereafter may become 
barred by any statute of limitations, and whether the obligation to repay such amounts 
may be or hereafter may become otherwise unenforceable .... 
(R, p. 878.) 
IFB is claiming that the protection of the anti-deficiency statute was waived by the 
Bridges when they signed this 2008 Deed of Trust with this cross-collateralization provision. For 
numerous reasons, IFB violated public policy by having the Bridges sign this boilerplate and 
over-reaching provision. Therefore, the provision should not be enforced to recover any further 
amounts under the 2006 Cottage Note. 
First, public policy voids any contractual provision that attempts to violate state statute, 
and waiver is no defense to that violation of statute. See Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. 
# 40 I, 14 7 Idaho 277, 286-88, 207 P .3d 1008, 1017-19 (2009) ("If a contract is illegal and void, 
the court will leave the parties as it finds them and refuse to enforce the contract. The contract 
cannot be treated as valid by invoking waiver or estoppel. Therefore, because the Agreement was 
illegal and violative of the Act, ISIF cannot rely on the doctrines of waiver and estoppel to 
enforce the Agreement against Wernecke. . . . [T]his Court will not enforce an illegal contract, 
regardless of the fact that the parties knowingly entered into that contract." (Internal citations 
omitted)); see also AED, Inc. v. KDC Invs., LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 167, 307 P.3d 176, 184 (2013) 
(illegal contract violating statute); McDougall v. Kasiska, 48 Idaho 424, 436-37, 282 P. 943 
(1929) (public policy prohibited agreements containing usurious rates). Idaho has not yet 
addressed the specific issue of a contractual waiver of anti-deficiency protections, but our case 
law gives clear direction of how that issue should be resolved. 
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Second, case law from other jurisdictions has consistently rejected any contractual 
waivers of the anti-deficiency statute protections. See, e.g., Brunsoman v. Scarlett, 465 N.W.2d 
162, 163-69 (N.D. 1991) ("The rights and defenses granted debtors by the anti-deficiency 
judgment law would be largely illusory if a prospective creditor could compel a prospective 
debtor to waive them at the time the mortgage is executed. We therefore conclude, as have other 
courts, that, because of the public policy against deficiency judgments, the procedural rights 
granted mortgagors and vendees under the anti-deficiency judgment law cannot be contractually 
waived in advance of default."); Palm v. Schilling, 244 Cal. Rptr. 600, 609 (1988) ("The explicit 
language of [the anti-deficiency statute] brooks no interpretation other than that deficiency 
judgments are prohibited .... To allow a purchase money creditor to circumvent the absolute rule 
by enforcing a purported waiver of section 580b in exchange for other concessions would flaunt 
the very purpose of the rule .... Contractual waiver as the quid pro quo for any other concession 
is contrary to public policy."); Chem. Bank v. Belk, 41 N.C. App. 356, 363, 255 S.E.2d 421,426 
(1979) ("The protection of the anti-deficiency judgment statute ... cannot be waived since that 
statute was designed for the benefit of the general public and was not intended to be merely a 
right which could be waived or which purchasers could be compelled to waive as a prerequisite 
for obtaining financing."); Stretch v. Murphy, 166 Or. 439, 447-48, 112 P.2d 1018, 1021 (1941) 
("The [anti-deficiency] statute here involved is not one creating a merely personal privilege 
which may be waived. It is an inhibition against the court's rendering a certain kind of judgment 
in foreclosing a certain kind of mortgage. Its effect is to deprive the circuit court of power 
theretofore granted it by the legislature. Parties to contracts cannot by agreement invest courts 
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with jurisdiction not conferred upon the courts by law. That part of the contract before us which 
attempts to reinvest the circuit court with power of which it has been specifically divested by the 
legislature is void as contravening the declared public policy of this state. No right of action for 
damages can be based upon the breach of such illegal agreement."). Other states may have 
different variations of their anti-deficiency protections but the overall concept is the same -
statutes in Idaho and other states strictly limit how lenders can recover deficiencies, require exact 
compliance by lenders, and thereby create statutory protections for borrowers. 
Third, public policy voids any contractual provision that attempts a pre-default waiver of 
the protections of a statute of limitation. See, e.g., 51 Am Jur 2d Limitation of Actions § 349 
(2nd 2015) ("A purported waiver of the [statute of limitation] defense in the future, is void and 
unenforceable as contrary to public policy."); see also Haggerty v. Williams, 84 Conn. App. 675, 
680-82, 855 A.2d 264, 268-69 (2004) (listing thirteen jurisdictions holding such waivers to be 
unenforceable for two reasons: "we fear that if we were to uphold the validity of such waivers in 
the original contract, 'such a stipulation would be inserted in every promissory note and similar 
instrument as a matter of routine. The door would be open to the very abuses the statute was 
designed to prevent, and the result would be an annihilation of the statute."' (Internal citations 
omitted)); Ross v. Ross, 393 P.2d 933, 934 (1964) ("We have before held that the statutes of 
limitation of this state [Arizona] are declarations of public policy as well as a private right to the 
individual. Public policy cannot be wiped out by a private attempt to repeal the statutes in 
advance. The waiver of 'diligence in bringing suit' was ineffective." (Internal citations omitted)). 
Idaho does not appear to have addressed this specific issue yet. However, the reasons for 
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the rule are obvious: every contract would require a pre-default waiver of statute of limitation 
protections if that were allowed, thereby effectively eliminating all statutes of limitation. IFB 
could provide no case to challenge this proposition. Instead, IFB tried to confuse the Court by 
providing cases about waivers of statutes of limitation post-breach. Clearly those post-breach 
waivers are allowed and happen all the time and do nothing to undermine the purpose of statutes 
of limitation. 
Fourth, even ignoring the unenforceability of all waivers that violate statute and public 
policy, a waiver must be knowing and voluntary. See Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 
734, 639 P.2d 429, 432 (1981) ("Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known 
right or advantage."). Here, the cross-collateralization provision says nothing about the anti-
deficiency statute, so IFB cannot claim the Bridges made a knowing and intentional waiver of 
those protections. While the anti-deficiency protections of LC. § 45-1512 are well known and 
existing for decades, IFB chose not to give any meaningful disclosure of what statutory 
protections were purportedly being waived. IFB certainly should have specifically referenced 
those protections if it intended its boilerplate and non-negotiable Deed of Trust to contain a 
knowing and intentional waiver of those protections. Accordingly, IFB cannot enforce a waiver 
it never obtained. 
Fifth, the anti-deficiency statute is a statute of repose that extinguishes the debt, rather 
than just making the debt "barred by any statute of limitations [or] ... otherwise unenforceable," 
so the language in the cross-collateralization provision is not applicable. (See supra pp. 29-31.) 
For all of the above reasons, IFB's argument to undermine the District Court's prior ruling 
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dismissing the deficiency action should be rejected. 
VII. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Bridges are entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3). Attorney 
fees are allowed on appeal under LC. § 12-120(3) to the prevailing party for actions based on a 
note and/or a commercial transaction. Prehn v. Hodge, 161 Idaho 321, 385 P.3d 876, 887 (2016). 
Section 12-120(3) provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
Here, the Bridges prevailed before the District Court regarding litigation about a 
promissory note, finding that IFB could not recover any further on the 2006 Cottage Note. On 
appeal, the Bridges similarly should prevail. Therefore, pursuant to the plain language of the 
statute regarding a "note" and/or a commercial transaction, the Bridges are entitled to their 
attorney fees for prevailing on appeal regarding the dismissal of IFB 's claim for a deficiency on 
the 2006 Cottage Note. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons stated above, the Bridges respectfully request that this Court: (1) 
affirm the District Court's final Judgment permanently dismissing IFB's attempt to recover a 
deficiency on the 2006 Cottage Note; and (2) reverse the District Court's order failing to apply 
res judicata principles to bar IFB' s untimely attempt to raise a cross-collateralization argument to 
collaterally attack that final Judgment. 
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